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A FEDERAL APPELLATE SYSTEM FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY
Carl Tobias*
Abstract: In December 1998, the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal
Courts of Appeals issued a report and recommendations for Congress and the President. The
commission resulted from ongoing controversy over splitting the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. The commissioners clearly suggested that the circuit remain intact but
proposed three regionally based adjudicative divisions for the appeals court. However, the
commission did not adduce persuasive empirical evidence that the Ninth Circuit experiences
difficulties that are sufficiently problematic to warrant treatment, particularly with the
essentially untested divisional arrangement. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit should continue to
experiment with promising measures.
The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals recently issued its report on the intermediate appellate courts
and recommendations for their improvement and submitted the report
and suggestions to Congress and the President.' This commission, which
Congress authorized the Chief Justice of the United States to appoint a
year ago, had an invaluable opportunity to assess the appeals courts and
develop helpful proposals for change and, thus, to influence appellate
justice as the twenty-first century opens. The commission resulted from
lengthy, continuing controversy over the advisability of dividing the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The commissioners clearly and
strongly rejected the idea of splitting the Ninth Circuit and endorsed the
alternative of creating adjudicative divisions for the Ninth Circuit now
and for the remaining circuits as they increase in size.
The publication of the commission's report and recommendations is
significant because the appeals courts are at a critical juncture. The
federal appellate system has served Congress, the federal courts, and the
nation very well for more than a century. However, the circuits have
experienced a striking increase in appeals, which has transformed the
courts since the 1970s; this crisis of volume could threaten the system.
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. I wish to
thank Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions and Eleanor Davison for processing this piece. Errors
that remain are mine.
1. Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Final Report (Dec.
1998), available in <http:llapp.comm.uscourts.govJfinallappstruc.pdf> [hereinafter Commission
Report].
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The independent, expert nature of the commission and the time and
care that it devoted to evaluating the intermediate appellate courts meant
that the commission's report and suggestions would enjoy the respect, or
at least receive deference from, many members of the federal judiciary
and of Congress. Some senators have scrutinized the commission's
report and proposals and introduced bills that would implement the
entity's recommendations.' Several members of Congress from the West,
who agreed to the study as a compromise and perhaps as a condition
precedent to dividing the Ninth Circuit, might well offer measures that
would split the court now that the commissioners have rejected this
possibility. The ultimate impact of the report remains unclear, but it will
apparently be substantial.
All of the factors examined above mean that the recently issued
report and suggestions of the Commission on Structural Alternatives
for the Federal Courts of Appeals warrant analysis. This Article
undertakes that effort by assessing the commission's report and finds
that several of its proposals deserve implementation but require circuit-
specific experimentation and evaluation to insure effective system-wide
reform. Part I of the Article explores the origins and development of
the commission. Part II then traces the entity's efforts in compiling its
report and recommendations. Part III analyzes the commission's report
and suggestions. Part IV offers recommendations for the future.
I. THE COMMISSION'S ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
The history of the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals is important because the intense debate and
divergent views that led to the commission's establishment may have
affected the final report and could shape Congress's response to it.3
Comprehensive treatment is required because this kind of evaluation
should improve understanding of the report and suggestions that the
commission recently completed. For instance, it is important to
appreciate that a House-Senate Conference Committee approved the
2. S. 253, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 186, 106th Cong. (1999).
3. Some features of the commission's background have been chronicled elsewhere. See, e.g., Carl
Tobias, An Analysis of Federal Appellate Court Study Commissions, 74 Denv. U. L. Rev. 65 (1996);
see also Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995, S. Rep. No. 104-197 (1995)
[hereinafter Senate Report]. See generally Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries:
Why the Proposal to Divide the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Is Not Such a
Good Idea, 22 Ariz. St. L.J. 917 (1990).
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national study as a replacement for an appropriations rider that would
have bifurcated the Ninth Circuit.4 The commission, therefore, resulted
from diverse legislative developments and a compromise struck by
members of Congress with quite different perspectives. Moreover, the
commission's charge was rather unclear and general, leaving many
parameters of the analysis to commission discretion.
A. General Background
Congress instituted the modem appellate system with the 1891
passage of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act, legislation that was
popularly known as the Evarts Act.' Lawmakers thereafter created two
new appellate courts and realigned the boundaries of two regional
circuits. In 1948, Congress expressly recognized the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, which resolves numerous cases
challenging federal administrative agency determinations.6 In 1982,
Congress established the Federal Circuit and assigned the court national
jurisdiction over appeals that principally involve customs, patents,
trademarks, copyrights, and claims against the United States.7
The initial circuit realignment occurred relatively early in the history
of the system. In 1929, senators and representatives created the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals by extracting Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming from the Eighth Circuit and leaving
Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and
4. See Commission Report supra note 1, at 34; see also Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305(a), 111 Stat.
2491, 2491-92 (1997); S. 1022, 105th Cong. § 305 (1997).
5. Circuit Court of Appeals Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 41-49 (1994)). See generally Felix Frankfurter & James Landis, The Business of the Supreme
Court: A Study in the Federal Judicial System 103-28 (1928). I rely in Part L.A on Carl Tobias, The
Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting, 44 Emory LJ. 1357 (1995).
6. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 41, 62 Stat. 869, 870 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 41
(1994)); see also Patricia M. Wald, Life on the District of Columbia Circuit: Literally and
Figuratively Halfvay Between the Capitol and the White House, 72 Wrn. L. Rev. 1 (1987); Colloquy,
The Contributions of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 Admin. L. Rev. 507 (1988). ,
7. Act of Apr. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 41
(1994)). See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfiss, Symposium, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1989); United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit Tenth Anniversary Commemorative Issue, 41 Am. U. L. Rev. 559 (1992).
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South Dakota in that court.' Congress authorized the new Tenth Circuit
to address increasing caseloads in the Eighth Circuit.9
Docket growth did not become a systemic complication until the
1960s when Congress began to enlarge federal court jurisdiction
dramatically. Lawmakers prescribed many new civil actions and
criminalized much activity, and this legislation promoted a 200% annual
increase in appellate filings between 1975 and 1995.10 Congress approved
numerous new appellate court judgeships; however, it did not authorize
enough additional judges to address the large number of increasingly
complicated civil and criminal cases that litigants appealed." Each circuit
has treated mounting dockets by restricting the written decisions and oral
arguments it affords and by relying more substantially on support staff.12
The appeals courts vary significantly, nevertheless. All the circuits have
encountered growing caseloads, but the courts have done so during
different periods, at diverse rates, and with varying resources and
measures to address dockets. 3
Federal judges' concerns about the rising number of appeals prompted
Congress to establish the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System (Hruska Commission) in 1972.14 This commission
thoroughly analyzed the circuits and proposed that Congress split the two
biggest appeals courts, the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits, rather than
proffering a more comprehensive approach, such as reconfiguration of
the entire system's boundaries. 5 The commission was reluctant to
8. Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, 45 Stat. 1346, 1347 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §41
(1994)).
9. See Baker, supra note 2, at 923-24. See generally Arthur J. Stanley & Irma S. Russell, The
Political and Administrative History of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 60
Deny. L.J. 119, 124-28 (1983).
10. Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, H.R. Rep. No. 105-
26, at 1 (1997). [hereinafter House Report].
11. See id.
12. See, e.g., 8th Cir. R. 34A; 11th Cir. R. 36; see also Arthur D. Hellman, Central Staff in
Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 937, 938-40 (1980); Carl
Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 Comell L. Rev. 1264,
1267-68 (1996).
13. See Carl Tobias, Some Cautions About Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 51 U.
Miami L. Rev. 389, 395 (1997) (citing multiple sources).
14. Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807; see also Commission on Revision of
the Federal Court Appellate System, The Geographical Boundaries of the Several Judicial Circuits:
Recommendations for Change, 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973) [hereinafter Hruska Commission].
15. Hruska Commission, supra note 14, at 228.
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disturb institutions that enjoyed the loyalty and respect of their
constituents and to disrupt the sense of community that judges and
attorneys had seemingly developed within the appellate courts. 6
The Hruska Commission grounded its recommendation that Congress
divide the Fifth and Ninth Circuits on general criteria respecting
alignment. 7 Congress created the Eleventh Circuit by removing Alabama,
Florida, and Georgia from the Fifth Circuit and leaving Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas in that court.' Congress divided the Fifth Circuit
because of its size in terms of geography, population, caseloads and
judgeships and because the court's active judges agreed on bifurcation.'
The Hruska Commission's suggestion that Congress split California and
reassign its district courts to two different circuits was not predicted and
was highly controversial; thus, the idea delayed serious legislative
consideration of the Ninth Circuit's division during the 1970s.2"
Multiple evaluations of the federal courts preceded the study
undertaken by the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal
Courts of Appeals. Some non-governmental entities, including the
American Bar Association (ABA), conducted assessments of the appeals
courts after the Hruska Commission had concluded its analysis." In
1988, Congress empowered the Federal Courts Study Committee, an
independent group consisting of respected members of Congress and the
judiciary as well as practicing lawyers, to evaluate the federal courts and
develop suggestions for improvement.' This entity determined that the
circuits had encountered a crisis of volume that had dramatically altered
16. Id.
17. The standards provided that: (1) at least three states would constitute circuits; (2) appeals
courts should not be established that would immediately require more than nine judges; (3) circuits
ought to include states that have diverse populations, legal business, and socio-economic interests;
(4) realignment should not unduly interfere with existing appellate court boundaries; and (5) appeals
courts should consist of contiguous states. Hruska Commission, supra note 14, at 231-32.
18. Act of Oct. 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 41 (1994)). See generally H.R. Rep. No. 96-1390, at 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4236;
Baker, supra note 3, at 925-28.
19. See Baker, supra note 3, at 927.
20. Hruska Commission, supra note 14, at 234-35; Arthur D. Hellman, Legal Problems of
Dividing a State Between Federal Judicial Circuits, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1188 (1974).
21. American Bar Assoc. Standing Comm. on Federal Judicial Improvements, The United States
Courts of Appeals: Reexamining Structure and Process After a Century of Growth, reprinted in 125
F.R.D. 523, 542-44 (1989) [hereinafter ABA Report]. See generally Thomas E. Baker, Rationing
Justice on Appeal 39-40 (1994).
22. See Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee (1990) [hereinafter Courts Study]; see also
Federal Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 101, 102 Stat. 4642,4644 (1988).
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them during the preceding quarter-century.' The Committee found that
"more fundamental change" seemed inevitable, unless appellate workloads
decreased, a prospect that appeared remote.24 The Committee canvassed
five fundamental structural measures for addressing caseload growth to
promote future inquiry and discussion among the federal government's
branches and attorneys, but it endorsed none of the alternatives.2 ' The
entity also urged Congress to authorize a five-year study of the appellate
court dockets and structural options for treating appeals.26
Lawmakers failed to approve the Federal Courts Study Committee's
proposed evaluation but did require that the Federal Judicial Center
(FJC) conduct an analysis of structural alternatives, which the FJC
finished in 1993 .27 The FJC found that the regional circuits were
confronting stress that structural changes would not "significantly
relieve., 28  The Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial
Conference of the United States also concluded a rather comprehensive
examination of the federal courts and published a final report in March
1995.29 The Committee essentially disfavored realigning appellate courts,
and it assessed the possibilities of according district judges greater
appellate responsibilities and reducing the size of appeals court panels.30
None of these assessments, however, prompted legislative action to
modify the federal appellate court system.
B. Ninth Circuit
Recent congressional developments regarding the possible division of
the Ninth Circuit warrant comparatively comprehensive examination
here because they eventually resulted in legislative approval of the
23. Courts Study, supra note 22, at 109.
24. See id.
25. Id. at 116-23; see also Tobias, supra note 5, at 1396-1400.
26. Courts Study, supra note 22, at 116.
27. Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 302,
104 Stat. 5104; see also Judith A. McKenna, Structural and Other Alternatives for the Federal
Courts of Appeals: Report to the United States Congress and the Judicial Conference of the United
States 1 (Federal Judicial Center 1993). The FJC is the federal courts' arm for research and
continuing education. Its purpose is "to further the development and adoption of improved
administration" in federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 620(a) (1994).
28. See McKenna, supra note 27, at 155.
29. Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts (1995) [hereinafter Long Range Plan].
30. Id. at 42, 123-24.
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national study commission." Congress has debated the possibility of
restructuring the Ninth Circuit almost since the system's inception, and
most recently considered division in the 104th and 105th Congresses.
1. Earlier Proposals to Split the Ninth Circuit and the Circuit's
Ameliorative Efforts
Proposals to split the Ninth Circuit have been made since the 1930s.
32
The Hruska Commission's suggestion that Congress bifurcate the court
was predictable; however, the recommendation that California be divided
and that its four district courts be reassigned to different circuits was not
foreseen.33 This idea sparked controversy and delayed congressional
examination of the court's bifurcation during the 1970s.34 A circuit-
splitting proposal that senators sponsored in 1983 evoked minimal
legislative interest.35
The Ninth Circuit responded to certain criticisms of the court's
performance by attempting to improve its administration. During 1978,
Congress empowered appeals courts having more than fifteen active
judges to reorganize with administrative units and to implement
streamlined mechanisms for conducting en banc proceedings.36 The
Ninth Circuit responded creatively to this congressional authorization by
restructuring into three constituents for greater decentralization and more
efficient administration.37 The court concomitantly adopted a local rule
prescribing a limited en banc mechanism under which the chief judge
31. For other sources that chronicle recent congressional activity, see generally supra note 1.
32. See Baker, supra note 3, at 928; see also Office of the Circuit Executive, United States Courts
for the Ninth Circuit, Position Paper in Opposition to S. 1686 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Reorganization Act (1991) [hereinafter S. 1686 Position Paper] (affording additional historical
background).
33. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 20 and accompanying text
35. See S. 1156, 98th Cong. (1983); Baker, supra note 3, at 928; Circuit Breaker-Move on to
Split the Ninth, 70 A.B.A. J. 34,34 (1984).
36. "Any court of appeals having more than 15 active judges may constitute itself into
administrative units.., and may perform its en banc function by such number of members of its en
banc court as may be prescribed by rule of the court of appeals.' Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633, supplemented by Act of Oct. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94
Stat. 2035 (1981).
37. See Baker, supra note 3, at 929. See generally Joseph Cecil, Administration of Justice in a
Large Appellate Court: The Ninth Circuit Innovations Project 13-14 (1985); Office of the Circuit
Executive, United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit, S. 948 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Reorganization Act 6-7 (1989) [hereinafter S. 948 Position Paper].
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and ten active judges who are randomly selected sit en banc to rehear
cases on a majority vote of all active judges.3" These were not the only
ameliorative efforts that the Ninth Circuit undertook.
Ninth Circuit judges have increased their productivity, and the court
has instituted numerous internal reforms. For example, the circuit employs
prebriefing conferences to narrow issues for appeal, limit the size of briefs,
and examine the possibility of settlement.39 The court's staff has enhanced
its efficiency, and the circuit has implemented many technological
advances.40 In 1989, the court published a report for Congress claiming that
these measures had permitted it to decide the biggest caseload efficaciously,
that there were no reasons to divide the circuit, and that the reforms used
would enable the court to accommodate greater growth." Despite these
assurances, Congress continued considering proposals to split the circuit
during the 1980s and 1990s.
2. Activities of the 104th Congress
a. Circuit-Splitting Bills
During May 1995, senators representing Pacific Northwest states
offered proposed legislation that would have divided the Ninth Circuit."
This marked the fourth analogous effort to bifurcate the court in the
38. 9th Cir. R. 35-3 (formerly Rule 25). See generally ABA Report, supra note 21, at 542-43;
Paul D. Carrington et al., Justice On Appeal 161-63, 200-03 (1976); Steven Bennett et al., "Mini"
In Banc Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit Practices, 34 Clev. St. L. Rev. 531 (1986).
39. See Baker, supra note 3, at 932; John B. Oakley, The Screening of Appeals: The Ninth
Circuit's Experience in the Eighties and Innovations for the Nineties, 1991 BYU L. Rev. 859, 875-
80, 907-10; see also S. 948 Position Paper, supra note 37, at 6-7; Cecil, supra note 37, at 79-95.
40. See Baker, supra note 3, at 932; Cathy Catterson, The Changing Ninth Circuit, 21 Ariz. St.
L.J. 173, 176-78 (1989); Hellman, supra note 12, at 943-46; see also Office of the Circuit
Executive, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Position Paper in Opposition to S. 956-Ninth Circuit
Court ofAppeals Reorganization Act of 1995 (June 22, 1995), reprinted in 141 Cong. Rec. S 10,436
(daily ed. July 10, 1995) (lauding court's experimentation) [hereinafter S. 956 Position Paper].
41. Judicial Council and United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Fourth Biennial
Report to Congress on the Implementation of Section 6 of the Omnibus Judgeships Act of 1978 and
Other Measures to Improve the Administration of Justice in the Ninth Circuit (1989). Senate Bill
948, introduced by circuit-splitting proponents during 1989, was the "most credible effort" to divide
the Ninth Circuit that advocates had staged prior to 1995. See Baker, supra note 3, at 932. However,
they apparently failed to persuade Congress of bifurcation's propriety, while the bill's opponents
seemed to counter convincingly the proponents' arguments. Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm.
On Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 361 (1990)
[hereinafter S. 948 Hearing].
42. S. 956, 104th Cong. (1995); see also S. 853, 104th Cong. (1995) (providing earlier similar bill).
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preceding thirteen years.43 One measure, Senate Bill 956, would have
placed Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington in a new
Twelfth Circuit and would have left Arizona, California, Hawaii,
Nevada, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands in the Ninth Circuit.'
The bill authorized nine active judges for the new Twelfth Circuit and
nineteen active members for the proposed Ninth Circuit, but it did not
create any new judgeships.45
In September of that year, the Senate Judiciary Committee conducted
a hearing on Senate Bill 956, and the Committee heard much helpful
testimony and received additional instructive information from advocates
and opponents of circuit-splitting.46 During a December markup, the
Committee approved an amendment that would have placed California,
Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands in the Ninth Circuit
with fifteen judges. The amendment would have included the other states
of the current Ninth Circuit-Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
Oregon, and Washington-in a new Twelfth Circuit with thirteen judges.47
Advocates and opponents of the amendment disagreed over every
justification articulated in support of circuit division.
Supporters of circuit splitting relied primarily on four main arguments.
First, proponents of bifurcation emphasized the difficulties that the
circuit's substantial magnitude has allegedly caused. These complications
included the court's enormous geographic expanse, its large number of
judges (twenty-eight), the circuit's overwhelming docket, and the great
cost of operating the court.48 Advocates of circuit splitting believed that
the Ninth Circuit's reforms were insufficient to address these problems.
Critics of circuit division responded in several ways to these
contentions. The opponents asserted that the court had implemented
measures addressing difficulties attributable to size. For instance, during
the 1980s, the circuit created administrative units in Pasadena and Seattle
for filing and orally arguing appeals, and that action reduced somewhat
43. See Baker, supra note 3, at 928-45; Tobias, supra note 5, at 1363-75.
44. S. 956. See generally Baker, supra note 3, at 928-45; Tobias, supra note 5, at 1363-75.
45. S. 956.
46. See Ninth Circuit Split: Hearings on S. 956 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. (1995) [hereinafter S. 956 Hearings].
47. See Senate Judiciary Comm. Markup of S. 956 (Dec. 7, 1995); see also Senate Report, supra
note 3, at 2.
48. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton); id. at
S7505-06 (statement of Sen. Bums).
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the distances that attorneys and parties must travel.49 Thus, critics claimed
that creating a Twelfth Circuit would not decrease travel distances for
many lawyers currently practicing in the area that would have been
encompassed by the new court. Opponents also contended that the circuit's
size provided advantages. For example, it afforded economies of scale
while offering diversity in terms of case complexity and novelty and in
terms of judges' political perspectives and geographic origins."
A second important argument of Senate Bill 956's champions was that
Ninth Circuit case precedent lacked consistency. The statistical
possibilities for conflicting decisions on a court with twenty-eight judges
appear significant when 3278 different combinations of three-judge
panels are possible.51 The Ninth Circuit Executive Office and experts
who have evaluated the court have discovered too little inconsistency to
require action as drastic as bifurcation. 2 The circuit has concomitantly
implemented procedures that limit inconsistency. For example, the
court's staff attorneys thoroughly scrutinize all cases and they code into a
computer the issues to be resolved.53 Using this system, the circuit
assigns to a single three-judge panel those appeals that involve analogous
issues and that are ready for resolution at the same time. 4
The third contention of split proponents was that the court's California
judges, viewpoints, and cases dominated the Pacific Northwest. This idea
partly implicated opposition to Ninth Circuit opinions in areas such as
criminal and environmental law.55 These advocates suggested that a new
Twelfth Circuit would better represent the regional views of the
northwest states. Critics of the court's bifurcation, however, claimed that
a better means of securing changes in the substantive law was to
49. See supra note 36.
50. See, e.g., S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 40; Steve Albert, Congress Weighs Plan to Divide
Ninth Circuit, Legal Times, Feb. 1, 1993, at 12, 13 (quoting former Chief Judge James Browning's
assertion that court's diversity is asset).
51. See S. 956 Hearings, supra note 46 (statement of Sen. Gorton); Baker, supra note 3, at 938.
52. See S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 40, at 4-5; Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboisn and
Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice ofPrecedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 541 (1989).
53. Hellman, supra note 12, at 945; see also U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit General
Order 4.1 (1987).
54. Hellman, supra note 12, at 945.
55. See, e.g., 171 Cong. Rec. S7504, supra note 48 (statement of Sen. Gorton); 171 Cong.
Rec. S7505-06, supra note 48 (statement of Sen. Bums).
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persuade Congress to modify it.16 Opponents correspondingly questioned
the advocates' underlying premise that judges who were stationed in
California were monolithic and idiosyncratic.57 Analysis of the judges'
perspectives and the computerized, random selection of three-judge panels
rendered untenable attempts to stereotype these jurists, while a majority of
the courts' active judges were not even located in California. 8
Proponents and critics articulated several other ideas in favor of and
against the Ninth Circuit's division. Opponents stated that the new Ninth
Circuit would have had a significantly less advantageous ratio of three-
judge panels to cases than the proposed Twelfth Circuit and a much less
beneficial ratio than the existing Ninth Circuit. Panels of the new Ninth
Circuit would have annually addressed 1014 filings and panels of the
proposed Twelfth Circuit would have annually treated 645 cases, while
panels of the Ninth Circuit decided 868 appeals at the time.59 Critics also
contended that the new Twelfth Circuit would have entailed considerable
administrative cost and duplicated functions that the Ninth Circuit then
discharged effectively.' Opponents concomitantly asserted that many
active judges of the court and numerous lawyers who practiced before it
opposed division.6
1
Advocates of bifurcation claimed that judges on a smaller circuit, such
as the projected Twelfth Circuit that would have had nine judges, would
be more collegial, thus increasing efficiency.62 This idea had some force,
but familiarity might have fostered detrimental routinization and could
56. See, e.g., S. 948 Hearing, supra note 41, at 284, 286 (statement of Sen. Pete Wilson); Daniel
Trigoboff, Northwest Favors Splitting "California" Circuit, Legal Times, June 12, 1989, at 2
(quoting former Chief Judge Alfred Goodwin).
57. Baker, supra note 3, at 941; Tobias, supra note 5, at 1373.
58. Baker, supra note 3, at 941; Tobias, supra note 5, at 1373.
59. See S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 40, at 6; see also Office of the Circuit Executive,
United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit, Position Paper in Opposition to S. 956-Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1995 and Companion Bill H.R. 2935, at 3 (Feb. 3, 1996)
(December markup realignment assigning 1065 appeals annually to proposed Ninth Circuit and 765
appeals annually to proposed Twelfth Circuit) [hereinafter Second S. 956 Position Paper].
60. See S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 40, at 2-3.
61. See Second S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 59, at 5; Senate Report, supra note 3, at 20-21;
Tobias, supra note 5, at 1371.
62. See S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 40; see also Senate Judiciary Markup of S. 956, supra
note 47 (approving 13 judges for reconfigured proposed Twelfth Circuit and 15 judges for
reconfigured proposed Ninth Circuit).
Washington Law Review
even have promoted disagreement. 63 The court's magnitude might have
forfeited advantages, namely diversity, that a larger court affords.
The debate between split proponents and split critics eventually resulted
in a compromise proposal to establish a national study commission. In
March 1996, several proponents of Senate Bill 956 encouraged the Senate
to pass the circuit division proposal as an amendment of a federal courts
appropriations measure. Opponents vigorously challenged this effort on
procedural grounds, although senators engaged in considerable substantive
debate over splitting the circuit.' Advocates and critics ultimately agreed
to a study commission measure that garnered much bipartisan support, and
the Senate approved a commission on March 21.65 When the House
received the Senate proposal, it assigned the proposal to the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration, which
Representative Carlos Moorhead (R-Cal.) chaired. The House took no
further action on the Senate measure during the 104th Congress, but
Congress budgeted $500,000 for the commission's work even though it
did not pass authorizing legislation.66
b. Commission Proposals
The Senate study commission proposal was apparently an acceptable
compromise, although the time prescribed for completing the commission's
work would have been inadequate. The Senate measure mandated that
the commission report to the President and the Congress no later than
February 28, 1997 and that the Senate Judiciary Committee take action
within sixty days of receiving the document.67 This proposal, allowing
less than a year, differed from a prior study commission measure
providing two years for the endeavor and calling for no Judiciary
Committee action on the report, which Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.)
had tendered as an amendment and which the Committee rejected on a
63. See Carl Tobias, The D.C. Circuit as a National Court, 48 U. Miami L. Rev. 159, 169-70
(1993). See generally Frank M. Coffin, On Appeal213-29 (1994).
64. 142 Cong. Rec. S2219-2303 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996).
65. 142 Cong. Rec. S2544, S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996). Rejection of division was advisable.
It would have been a limited reform and could have precluded more effective solutions, such as
creating a third tier of appellate courts or more judgeships.
66. 142 Cong. Rec. H11,164, HI 1,859 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996).
67. 142 Cong. Rec. S2545.
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close vote in its December 7, 1995 markup.68 Moreover, the Federal
Courts Study Committee, which undertook the most recent similar effort,
required eighteen months to finish its work.69 The Hruska Commission
consumed an identical period to perform a study of the appeals courts.70
It would have been unwise to create an entity that lacked the requisite
time to assemble the best information and to develop the finest
recommendations.
Somewhat analogous problems implicating scope may also have
attended the proposed entity's charge, which stated that the commission
was to:
(1) study the present division of the United States into the several
judicial circuits;
(2) study the structure and alignment of the Federal Courts of
Appeals, with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit; and
(3) report to the President and the Congress its recommendations
for such changes in circuit boundaries or structure as may be
appropriate for the expeditious and effective disposition of the
caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeal, consistent with
fundamental concepts of fairness and due process.7 '
The mandate might have been too circumscribed because, for
instance, the first two components did not expressly mention docket
growth, which is the principal problem that the appeals courts now
confront.7' However, those commands could have been read to include
mounting caseloads, and the third stricture explicitly prescribed
recommendations "for the expeditious and effective disposition" of
appeals.73
Perhaps most restrictive was the requirement that suggestions pertain
to "such changes in circuit boundaries or structure as may be appropriate"
68. Senate Judiciary Comm. Markup of S. 956, supra note 47 (statement of Sen. Feinstein); see
also Senate Report, supra note 3, at 19-20.
69. See supra note 23.
70. See supra note 14.
71. 142 Cong. Rec. S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996). Senator Feinstein's proposal was similar, but
it did not include "with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit." See Senate Judiciary Comm.
Markup ofS. 956, supra note 47 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). However, any national analysis of the
appeals courts might well have emphasized this circuit.
72. See, e.g., Courts Study, supra note 22, at 109; Baker, supra note 21, at 33.
73. 142 Cong. Rec. S2545.
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for prompt and efficacious resolution.74 Limiting the commission to
structural options might have been overly narrow, because courts have
numerous structural means of addressing the difficulties ascribed to
rising dockets. Illustrative are increases in resources, such as judges and
staff, and numerous procedures for expediting appellate disposition,
which many courts have applied.75 Congress could have discouraged
consideration of many potentially helpful alternatives by apparently
confining the commission to non-structural alterations.
When the Senate was debating the advisability of splitting the Ninth
Circuit and approving S. 956, Governor Pete Wilson (R-Cal.) and Ninth
Circuit Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain developed different proposals for
establishing a commission to analyze the court. Governor Wilson aired
the prospect in a letter to Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Chair of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, as the Committee prepared for the
December 1995 Committee markup." Judge O'Scannlain examined the
possibility of establishing a commission when testifying in the September
1995 Judiciary Committee hearing.77 These proposals warrant little
analysis here because their Ninth Circuit focus meant that they would have
been incomplete by definition; Congress chose to authorize the recently
completed national study, which the Wilson and O'Scannlain proposals
only minimally inform.78
3. Activities of the 105th Congress
Members of the 105th Congress held varying viewpoints on problems
facing the Ninth Circuit. Efforts in the House focused on the need for a
national study of the appellate system, while the Senate proposed a more
drastic solution, a circuit split. In the end, the 105th Congress adopted a
modified version of the House proposal, but it left many aspects of the
national study effort unclear.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Senate Report, supra note 3, at 27-28; Tobias, supra note 5, at 1363-64, 1405-07.
76. Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to Senator Orrin Hatch, Chair, U.S. Senate
Judiciary Comm. (Dec. 6, 1995) (on file with author).
77. S. 956 Hearings, supra note 46, at 69 (statement of Ninth Circuit Judge O'Scannlain),
reprinted in pertinent part in Diarmuid O'Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit Split Is Inevitable, But Not
Imminent, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 947 (1995).





The continuing debate over whether the Ninth Circuit should be split
prompted senators and representatives to introduce several bills
authorizing evaluations of the federal appeals courts during the first
session of the 105th Congress. In January 1997, Senators Dianne
Feinstein (D-Cal.) and Harry Reid (D-Nev.) offered a measure that
would have created a national commission to assess the appellate
courts.79 Senator Conrad Bums (R-Mont.) and Representative Rick Hill
(R-Mont.) then introduced the same study commission bill that differed
in important respects from the one proffered by Senators Feinstein and
Reid.80 During March, Representatives Howard Coble (R-N.C.) and
Howard Berman (D-Cal.) proposed a measure that was similar to the
Feinstein-Reid bill, which the House later changed somewhat.8 That
month, a number of senators from Pacific Northwest states introduced a
bill that would have bifurcated the Ninth Circuit by moving Alaska,
Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington to the
projected Twelfth Circuit and leaving California, Hawaii, Guam, and the
Northern Mariana Islands in the current Ninth Circuit.
82
The Coble-Berman measure, H.R. 908, warrants emphasis because it
most closely resembles the legislation that passed, while the other
proposals have been analyzed elsewhere.83 H.R. 908 was analogous in
several significant ways to the study commission measures that the 104th
Congress considered. The proposal instructed the entity to "study the
structure and alignment of the Federal Court of Appeals system, with
particular reference to the Ninth Circuit."' 4 The second phrase, therefore,
changed the concept employed in the 104th Congress by adding the term
"system," thus clarifying and stressing the systemic character of the
evaluation prescribed." H.R. 908 also mandated that the commission
"report... its recommendations for such changes in circuit boundaries or
structure as may be appropriate for the expeditious and effective
79. S. 248, 105th Cong. (1997). The ideas in this paragraph and the remainder of Part I.B.3 are
premised on conversations with individuals who are knowledgeable about the developments that
occurred.
80. S. 283, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 639, 105th Cong. (1997).
81. H.R. 908, 105th Cong. (1997).
82. S. 431, 105th Cong. (1997).
83. Tobias, supra note 78, at 205-14.
84. H.R 908, § 1(b)(2).
85. Compare S. 248, § 1(b)(2), H.1L 908, with S. 956, § 1(b)(2), 104th Cong.
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disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeal, consistent
with fundamental concepts of fairness and due process."86
In early June, the House passed a revised version of the Coble-Berman
measure that included a number of compromises.87 This measure adopted
the reporting provision discussed immediately above and accorded the
commission eighteen months to complete the assessment. The bill was
transmitted to the Senate and remained at the desk awaiting action in the
upper chamber.
The legislative history that accompanied H.R. 908 is significant
because the House Committee Report on that bill provides the most
comprehensive discussion of the national study commission that
Congress approved. The bill received no hearings and little floor debate,
while the floor statements of the bill's principal sponsors, Representatives
Coble and Henry Hyde (R-Ill.), chair of the Judiciary Committee, were
primarily based on the House Report. The House Committee Report
concomitantly improves comprehension of the statutory terminology that
authorizes the study, particularly the wording that is terse or vague.
Moreover, the report was essentially the last, as well as the most thorough,
precise, and authoritative pronouncement on the long, complex process
behind the commission's approval.
The House Committee Report offered informative perspectives on the
commission and its duties, especially by elaborating and clarifying the
responsibilities that Congress envisioned for it. The report observed that
the measure originated in response to recurring efforts to split the biggest
of the federal circuits, the Ninth, but warned that H.R. 908 "represents a
sound approach to a problem of national concern: explosive growth in
the caseload of all of the courts of appeals."88 The Judiciary Committee
stated that the number of cases had risen by more than 200% and that
Congress had increased the number of judgeships, although less rapidly,
over the last two decades; yet, the appellate system's structure had
effectively remained the same since 1891.89 The report proclaimed that
the "time is ripe for a careful, objective study aimed at determining
whether that structure can adequately serve the needs of the 21st
86. H.R. 908, § 1(b)(3).
87. 143 Cong. Rec. H3225 (daily ed. June 3, 1997).





century" and that the commission would be responsible for conducting
the analysis.9"
The House Committee Report emphasized the prior efforts that led
Congress to authorize the commission. The report repeated that the
"immediate occasion for the Commission proposal was the debate over
dividing the- Ninth Circuit, [however] the proposal has its origins in the
work of the Federal Courts Study Committee, which Congress created in
1988."" This entity's 1990 report concluded that the federal appellate
courts were already experiencing a "crisis of volume" and expressed the
view that "within as few as five years the nation could have to decide
whether or not to abandon the present circuit structure in favor of an
alternative structure that might better organize the more numerous
appellate judges needed to grapple with a swollen caseload."'92 The
Federal Courts Study Committee evaluated, but did not endorse, five
alternatives, urging further inquiry and discussion.93
The Judiciary Committee said that the commission would "take up
where the Federal Courts Study Committee left off [and] would be the
first of its kind since the [Hruska Commission] which completed its work
in 1975." 9' The report considered it clear that:
[D]ramatic changes have taken place in the work of the federal
courts in those two decades, including the explosive growth noted
above [but that] there have been no structural alterations except for
the division of the old Fifth Circuit and the creation of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.9'
In the June 3, 1997 floor debate on H.R. 908, the study commission's
major champions proffered many observations analogous to those in the
report and frequently quoted from it. Illustrative are the statements of
Representative Coble, who chaired the Judiciary subcommittee that had
primary responsibility for the measure:
H.R. 908 was introduced in response to recurring attempts to divide
the largest of the Federal judicial circuits, the ninth. However, if
properly implemented, the commission proposal represents a sound
approach to a problem of national concern, and that is the explosive
90. Id. at 1-2.
91. Id. at 2; see also supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
92. Courts Study, supra note 22, at 109; see also House Report, supra note 10, at 2.
93. Courts Study, supra note 22, at 116-23; see also supra note 25.
94. House Report, supra note 10, at 2; see also supra notes 14-20,22-26 and accompanying text.
95. House Report, supra note 10, at 2; see also supra notes 7, 17-19 and accompanying text.
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growth in the caseload of all of the courts of appeals. The time is
right, it seems to me, for a careful, objective study aimed at
determining whether that structure can adequately serve the needs
of the 21st century. The task of the commission would be to carry
out that study.96
Representative Hyde, the House Judiciary Committee chair, reiterated
many sentiments expressed in the House Committee Report and
numerous concepts that Representative Coble voiced. For instance, the
chair repeated that the "goal of the commission will be to study the entire
Federal appellate court system, but, of course, with a particular view
toward addressing the problems facing the largest and most diverse
circuit we have, the ninth."97
The Judiciary Committee chair repeated and elaborated the notions
relating to the commission's origins and purposes that were expressed in
the report and in Representative Coble's floor statement. Representative
Hyde correspondingly confirmed that the commission would "take up
where the Federal Courts Study Committee left off" and detailed this
entity's most significant determinations, including the finding that the
appellate courts were encountering a "crisis of volume."9"
While H.R. 908 awaited Senate action, members of the Senate decided
to promote more extensive reforms. In mid-July, Senators Ted Stevens
(R-Alaska), Slade Gorton (R-Wash.), and Conrad Bums (R-Mont.), who
all served on the Appropriations Committee, convinced their colleagues
to adopt an appropriations rider that would have split the Ninth Circuit,
and on July 29, the entire Senate approved this rider. The measure would
have left California and Nevada in that court." The rider would have
established a new Twelfth Circuit that included Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii,
Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington, Guam, and the Northern Mariana
Islands." ° The measure prescribed fifteen judges for the Ninth Circuit
and thirteen judges for the Twelfth Circuit and provided the Twelfth
96. 143 Cong. Rec. H3223 (daily ed. June 3, 1997). He next remarked on the Hruska Commission
and recent "dramatic changes" in the appeals courts' work in terms that were quite similar. See supra
notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
97. 143 Cong. Rec. H3224.
98. Id. He stated that the study was timely, using data which showed that "in fiscal 1996, the
number of appeals filed in the 12 regional courts of appeals rose four percent to 51,991 [which was]
an all-time high in filings, with eight circuits reporting increases." Id.
99. I rely in the remainder of this and the next three paragraphs on S. 1022, 105th Cong. § 305
(1997) and 143 Cong. Rec. S8041 (daily ed. July 24, 1997).
100. 143 Cong. Rec. S8044.
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Circuit two co-equal headquarters and two co-equal court clerks in
Phoenix and Seattle.
Republican senators, primarily from the West, expressed numerous
ideas that had previously been voiced during the floor debate in favor of
Senate action that would divide the Ninth Circuit For instance, Senate
members reiterated the idea that the Ninth Circuit's magnitude in terms
of population, geography, dockets, and judges fosters difficulties, such as
travel costs and inconsistent case law."°' Several senators claimed that
the Supreme Court reversal rate demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit
requires division."0 2 They asserted that projections for population
increases in the West will multiply these complications.0 3
Senate critics of the court's bifurcation contended that there was too
much uncertainty about the exact character of the complications
confronting the Ninth Circuit and the other appeals courts, and the best
remedies for those problems, to institute drastic measures like bifurcating
the Ninth Circuit." For example, division advocates have claimed that
the Ninth Circuit's size precludes prompt appellate disposition; 5
however, minimal data correlate magnitude with time to resolution.
Moreover, opponents argued that the split would have improperly
distributed the court's docket. For instance, judges of the proposed
Twelfth Circuit would have had to decide 239 appeals annually, while
judges of the new Ninth Circuit would have had to resolve 363 cases
annually, which would have been fifty percent more.0 6 Despite the
critics' contentions, the Senate rejected 55-45 along political party lines
an amendment that would have approved a study analogous to that which
the House had authorized.0 7 Thus, the Senate approved a split as the
solution to the Ninth Circuit's problems.
101. See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. S8044 (statement of Sen. Gorton); 143 Cong. Rec. S8046-47
(statement of Sen. Hatch).
102. See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. S8047 (statement of Sen. Hatch); 143 Cong. Rec. S8047-48
(statement of Sen. Bums).
103. See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. S8044 (statement of Sen. Gorton); 143 Cong. Rec. S8048
(statement of Sen. Bums).
104. See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. S8041-44 (statement of Sen. Feinstein); 143 Cong. Rec. S8045
(statement of Sen. Leahy).
105. See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. S8050-51 (statement of Sen. Craig); 143 Cong. Rec. S8052-53
(statement of Sen. Kempthome).
106. See, e.g., 143 Cong. Rec. S8042 (statement of Sen. Feinstein); 143 Cong. Rec. S8060
(reprinting letter from Procter Hug, Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit, to Senator
Feinstein).
107. See 143 Cong. Rec. S8087.
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The appropriations rider prompted sharp criticism from Representatives
Hyde and Coble, and the California delegation. °8 These lawmakers
articulated a number of arguments against circuit splitting. For example,
the opponents argued that the division contemplated would inappropriately
allocate the caseload between the two new courts and that action as
drastic as bifurcation required clearer understanding of the precise
problems affecting the court and the appellate system, the impacts of
those difficulties, and the most efficacious ways of treating them.
In mid-November, the House-Senate Conference Committee on
Commerce-Justice-State Appropriations refused to adopt the appropriations
rider that would have split the Ninth Circuit."0 9 The committee replaced the
measure with a national study that included many features of the
measures both Houses had considered and effectively incorporated most
aspects of H.R. 908."' The compromise prescribed five commissioners,
all of whom the Chief Justice of the United States was to name within
thirty days; afforded the commission ten months to study and two months
to write a report and recommendations; and incorporated verbatim
H.R. 908's mandate. On December 19, Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed
retired Supreme Court Justice Byron White, U.S. Court of Appeals
Judges Gilbert Merritt of the Sixth Circuit, and Pamela Rymer of the Ninth
Circuit, U.S. District Judge William Browning of Arizona, and N. Lee
Cooper, the immediate past president of the American Bar Association."'
In sum, the November 1997 measure that authorized a national
commission to analyze the federal appeals courts left unclear certain
significant dimensions of the assessment and provided tfhe entity
comparatively little time to conclude its work. The second section of this
essay, therefore, examines the efforts that the commissioners instituted in
discharging the important responsibilities that Congress assigned them.
108. See, e.g., Letter from Henry J. Hyde, Chair, House Judiciary Comm., to Robert Livingston,
Chair, House Comm. on Appropriations (Sept. 5, 1997) (on file with author); Letter from Jerry
Lewis et al., Members of Congress from California, to Harold Rogers, Chair, Appropriations
Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary (Oct. 17, 1997) (on file with author). I also
rely in this paragraph on conversations with individuals who are knowledgeable about the
development that occurred.
109. Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat. 2491, 2491-92 (1997); Bill Kisliuk, White, Rymer to
Consider Circuit Split, Recorder, Dec. 22, 1997, at 1.
110. See 11 Stat. at 2491- 92; Kisliuk, supra note 109, at 1.




II. THE COMMISSION'S EFFORTS
Because numerous aspects of the work the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals undertook were not open
to the public, it is difficult to detail accurately all of the activities that the
Commission undertook in the course of the rather brief period that it had
to study and report on the federal appellate courts."' For instance,
meetings among the commissioners were generally private and commu-
nications between them and the staff were not public. In fairness, the
important, controversial, and delicate nature of the commission's work
and the desirability of fostering candid exchange may have necessitated
secrecy, while the commissioners instituted numerous efforts, such as the
establishment of a website, in an attempt to keep the public well
informed."' Notwithstanding these difficulties, it is possible to identify
many important initiatives of the entity partly by relying upon the
information included in the commission report.
Early in 1998, the commission instituted several efforts to organize its
work, as well as to collect, analyze and synthesize relevant information
on the federal appellate courts. At the commission's first formal meeting
during January 1998, it appointed Professor Daniel Meador, James
Monroe Professor of Law Emeritus at the University of Virginia, as the
Executive Director."4 One of the entity's initial actions was to enlist the
assistance of the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) and the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts (AO), the principal research arms of
the federal courts." 5 In the first phases of the commission's endeavors, it
requested that the FJC compile comprehensive lists of the problems that
the appellate courts were purportedly encountering and of potential
solutions for these difficulties." 6 The FJC thoroughly surveyed much of
the prior research on the regional circuits and compiled extensive
112. I rely in this section on the Commission's Report, see supra note 1, and on conversations
with numerous individuals who are familiar with the commission's work.
113. Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (visited Apr. 4,
1999) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov>.
114. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 2; see also § 305(a)(4)(A), 111 Stat. at 2492.
115. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 2. Congress had authorized the commission to invoke
the aid of these two entities, and the commissioners worked closely with the FJC and the AO during
much of the project. § 305(a)(4)(D), 111 Stat at 2492.
116. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 2.
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enumerations of the complications the courts apparently experienced and
possible remedies for them." 7
From the earliest stages, the commission also attempted to solicit
much public input on numerous issues that were relevant to its
mandate." 8 The commissioners held public hearings during March in
Atlanta and Dallas, partially because those cities are located in the two
appeals courts created from the former Fifth Circuit. The commission
conducted public hearings during April in Chicago and New York, two
of the nation's largest metropolitan areas and the location of the
headquarters for the Seventh and Second Circuits. The commissioners
held public hearings during May in Seattle and San Francisco, partly to
seek the views of those in the West on whether the Ninth Circuit was
encountering difficulties that were sufficiently problematic to warrant
treatment, particularly with measures as dramatic as circuit division. The
commission requested that witnesses address the problems it perceived
"in the federal appellate system's structure, organization, alignment,
processes, and personnel" which might interfere with "its ability to render
decisions that "are reasonably timely, are consistent among the litigants
appearing before it, are nationally uniform in their interpretations of
federal law, and are reached through processes that afford appeals
adequate, deliberative attention of judges.""..9 The commissioners also
sought potential remedies for the perceived complications and their
benefits and disadvantages while asking which aspects of the courts were
working well. Individuals and entities that did not, or could not, testify at
the hearings were invited to tender written submissions for commission
consideration.
Many witnesses who testified at the hearings were federal appellate
court judges. 2 ' The witnesses provided considerable helpful information
about the problems that increasing dockets and limited resources have
been presenting for the regional circuits and a plethora of possible
solutions for these complications. The commission heard a broad
spectrum of viewpoints related to the difficulties and the potential
remedies.
117. Id. at 3.
118. Id.
119. See News Release, Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals,
Appellate Commission Schedules Public Hearings (Feb. 26, 1998), available in <http://app.comm.
uscourts.gov./News-index.htm>.




Perhaps most interesting about the testimony was the striking lack of
entirely new ideas. Practically all of the witnesses proffered testimony
that essentially repeated concepts that they or others had expressed
elsewhere. For example, Eleventh Circuit Chief Judge Joseph Hatchett
and Gerald Bard Tjoflat, the court's former Chief Judge, continued their
debate over whether the appeals court needs additional active judgeships
to resolve its large, mounting caseload.' Chief Judge Hatchett testified
that the court "should expand in a limited fashion from twelve to fifteen
judges," while Judge Tjoflat opposed more judgeships.'2 However, each
judge had earlier made similar public pronouncements." Relatively few
witnesses stated that the circuits confront difficulties that are troubling
enough to deserve remediation, especially with approaches as drastic as
splitting appeals courts.
To assist in the inquiry, the Federal Judicial Center helped the
commission draft several survey instruments for soliciting applicable
material.'24 The commissioners then circulated questionnaires to
appellate and district judges as well as attorneys who had filed appeals to
solicit information about their experiences. The commission also sought
the views of the Supreme Court Justices."z Justice Anthony Kennedy,
who is a former member of the Ninth Circuit, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, who is the Justice with responsibility for the circuit, Justice
John Paul Stevens, Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Stephen Breyer
submitted responses." 6 The first four Justices claimed that the court was
121. See Testimony Before the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals, of Joseph Hatchett, Chief Judge, U.S. Courts for the Eleventh Circuit, and Gerald Bard
Tjolat, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Mar. 23, 1998) (on file with
author).
122. Id.
123. See Considering the Appropriate Allocation of Judgeships in the U.S. Courts ofAppeals for
the Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and
the Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 7, 1997 & June 9, 1997) (testimony of Chief
Judge Hatchett (on file with author); Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July
1993, at 70, 70.
124. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 4.
125. Id. at 3.
126. Letter from Stephen G. Breyer, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Byron R. White, Chair,
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Sept. 11, 1998) (on file
with author); Letter from Anthony Kennedy, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Byron R. White, Chair,
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Aug. 17, 1998) (on file
with author); Letter from Sandra Day O'Connor, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Byron R. White,
Chair, Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (June 23, 1998) (on
file with author); Letter from Antonin Scalia, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court to Byron R. White, Chair,
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too large and suggested that it be divided. They also proposed that three
regional circuits be created out of the existing Ninth Circuit. One court
would include the five states of the Pacific Northwest. A second would
encompass the Eastern and Northern Districts of California and Hawaii.
The third would include the Central and Southern Districts of California,
Arizona, Nevada, and the territories. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in
commenting on the commission's Tentative Draft Report, described the
divisional idea as "better than merely a compromise between those who
have advocated a split of the circuit and those who argue for the status
quo [which appeared] to address head-on most of the significant
concerns raised about the court" with minimal administrative disruption.
127 Justice Breyer acknowledged that congestion was the major difficulty
confronting the appellate courts, but he rejected circuit-splitting at this
juncture and urged the commission to consult the ideas included in the
Long Range Plan compiled by the Judicial Conference.
28
The commission then analyzed and synthesized all of the information
that it had solicited and received. For example, it compiled the results of
the surveys that were circulated to judges and attorneys and reviewed the
hearing testimony and written submissions tendered to the commission.
Based on this input, the commissioners wrote a tentative draft report and
recommendations which they issued for public comment on October 7,
1998.129 The commission afforded interested members of the public thirty
days to submit their views on the draft report and suggestions. The
commissioners reviewed the public input received, modified certain features
of the draft report and proposals in light of the public comment and finalized
their report and suggestions for Congress and the President in December.
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Aug. 21, 1998) (on file
with author); Letter from John Paul Stevens, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Byron R. White, Chair,
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (Aug. 24, 1998) (on file
with author).
127. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 39. & n.91 (quoting Letter from Chief Justice
Rehnquist to Byron White).
128. Letter from Stephen G. Breyer, supra note 126; see also Long Range Plan, supra note 29.




III. ANALYSIS OF THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Descriptive Analysis
The commission compiled a comprehensive report that showed that it
had studied the "present division of the United States into the several
judicial circuits [and] the structure and alignment of the Federal Court
of Appeals system" as well as approaches for facilitating the fair,
"expeditious and effective disposition" of caseloads. 3 ' The commission
report considered the problems that the Ninth Circuit and the appellate
system have encountered and may face in the future and explored
potential solutions for these difficulties.
The most pressing complications that the commission identified were
mounting dockets and insufficient resources to address those appeals.'
The report also suggested that the difficulties could prevent courts from
resolving cases as promptly, efficaciously, and equitably as was desirable.
The commission detected several other potential problems, principally in
its evaluation of the Ninth Circuit, which it characterized as less
significant. For example, the report evinced concerns about the ability of
the Ninth Circuit to function in an effective and timely manner, to produce
a coherent body of circuit law, and to perform its en banc functions
effectively."' The report also expressed concerns about how the size of
the court's geographic jurisdiction affected federalism, regionalism, and
efficacious court operations.'
The commission reviewed numerous possible solutions for the
complications discovered. The report examined several structural
remedies, including divisional organization of the circuits and the
prospects of two-judge panels and district court appellate panels
(DCAP).'34 The commission correspondingly considered certain non-
structural approaches, principally under the rubric of appellate jurisdiction,
which involved the resolution of bankruptcy appeals, general discretionary
review, and the Federal Circuit.'35
130. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
131. Commission Report, supra note 1, at ix, xi, 13-25.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 59-66.
135. Id. at 67-76.
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The report specifically comprised six sections. The first described the
commission's creation, mission, and activities.' 36 The second section
discussed the past and present circumstances of the federal appellate
system, emphasizing the transformation of the courts of appeals and their
work since the mid-1960s and the emergence of the circuit as an entity of
federal judicial administration. 3 7 Most of the commission's analysis
appears in the third through sixth sections of the report.
The third part, which constituted one-third of the report, considered
the Ninth Circuit and its court of appeals.'38 The section first described
the circuit and the court of appeals, summarized the arguments
propounded in the debate over splitting them and posited several criteria
that inform this debate.'39 The commissioners found Ninth Circuit
administration "at the least, on a par with that of other circuits, and
innovative in many respects" and added that there was "no good reason
to split the circuit solely out of concern for its size or administration [or]
to solve problems [of] ... consistency, predictability and coherence of
circuit law."' 40 The commission stated that dividing the court would
eliminate the administrative benefits that the current configuration offers
and would deprive the Pacific seaboard and the West of a means to
maintain consistent federal law in this region.'4' The commissioners
rejected circuit-splitting, unless there were no other way of treating
perceived difficulties in the court of appeals, and proffered adjudicative
divisions as an efficacious alternative for the Ninth Circuit, which should
be available to all of the appellate courts as they increase in size.'42 The
commission specifically suggested that the Ninth Circuit remain intact
but that it operate with three regionally based adjudicative divisions. The
commission proposed that each division with a majority of its judges
resident in its region have exclusive jurisdiction over appeals arising
from district courts in those areas."i The plan included a Circuit Division
to resolve conflicts that develop between regional divisions."44 The
136. Id. at 1-6.
137. Id. at 7-28.
138. Id. at 29-57.
139. Id. at 29-40.
140. Id. at ix.
141. Id. at ix-x.
142. Id. at x.
143. Id. at 43.
144. Id. at 43-46.
Vol. 74:275, 1999
Federal Appellate System
commissioners asserted that their "plan would increase the consistency
and coherence of the law, maximize the likelihood of genuine collegiality,
establish an effective procedure for maintaining uniform decisional law
within the circuit, and relate the appellate forum more closely to the region
it serves." 14
5
Realizing that Congress might reject the recommendation for
adjudicative divisions and restructure the Ninth Circuit, the commission
stated that the "challenges to finding a workable solution are
daunting."'146 The commissioners evaluated more than a dozen possible
alternatives and "found no merit in any of them."'47 Nonetheless, the
commission described three plans that it considered arguable. 148 The first
plan would leave Arizona, California, and Nevada in the Ninth Circuit
and place the remaining states and territories in the new Twelfth
Circuit. 149 The second plan would leave California, Nevada, Hawaii, and
the territories in the Ninth Circuit, move Arizona to the Tenth Circuit,
and place the Pacific Northwest states in a new Twelfth Circuit. 50 The
third plan would leave Arizona, the Central and Southern Districts of
California, Hawaii, Nevada, and the territories in the Ninth Circuit, and
place the Pacific Northwest states and the Eastern and Northern Districts
of California in a new Twelfth Circuit.' In the end, however, the
commission characterized each of these possibilities as flawed and
endorsed none.
The fourth section of the report examined structural options for all the
courts of appeals and urged Congress to accord the courts greater
flexibility.'52 The commissioners first remarked that they had developed
the idea of divisional organization both for the immediate Ninth Circuit
situation and as an alternative to circuit-splitting for the remaining
appeals courts as they grow.1'5 The commission, therefore, suggested
legislation that would afford individual courts considerable flexibility in
designing a divisional plan, emphasizing that the Ninth Circuit proposal
145. Id. at x; see also id. at 42-45.
146. Id. at 53.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 54-57.
149. Id at 54.
150. Id. at 55-56.
151. Id
152. Id. at 59-66.
153. Id. at 59.
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was only one model.'54 Recognizing that these courts vary in terms of
their size, dockets, judicial resources, and growth rates, the commission
urged that Congress "equip those courts to cope with future, unforeseen
conditions by according them a flexibility they do not now have."'55 The
commissioners specifically recommended that Congress authorize each
court to decide with panels of two, rather than three, judges appeals that
do not involve questions of public importance, pose special difficulty, or
have precedential value.'56 The commission also suggested that Congress
authorize circuits to create district court appellate panels consisting of
two district judges and one circuit judge to review designated categories
of cases, with discretionary review available in the court of appeals.'57
The commissioners contended that these measures collectively "should
equip the courts of appeals with an ability, structurally and procedurally,
to accommodate continued caseload growth into the indefinite future,
while maintaining the quality of the appellate process and delivering
consistent decisions-assuming, of course, that the system has the
necessary number ofjudges and other resources." '158
The fifth section evaluated the structural ramifications of several
specific features of appellate jurisdiction, although a majority of the
commission considered overall federal jurisdiction beyond the scope of
its mandate. 1" The commissioners suggested that Congress "not
authorize direct court of appeals review of bankruptcy decisions, pending
further study by the Judicial Conference."'" The commission believed
that legislative approval of direct review would exacerbate problems in the
appeals courts and "destroy the arguably successful innovation of
bankruptcy appellate panels" (BAP). 161 In the final analysis, the commission
concluded that Congress needed more information to make the best
decision and urged "Congress to refrain from changing the bankruptcy
appellate system until the Judicial Conference has an adequate opportunity
to study it and propose any necessary improvements."1 62
154. Id. at 60.
155. Id. at xi.
156. Id. at 62-64.
157. Id. at xi.
158. Id.; see also id. at 57-65.
159. Id. at xi; see also infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
160. Commission Report, supra note 1, at xi.
161. Id. at 67; see also infra note 178 and accompanying text.
162. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 70.
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The commission also analyzed the proposal that appellate court
jurisdiction be made discretionary for all appeals but proffered no
particular recommendation because it was not convinced that the change
was a good idea. 63 The commissioners, without providing any specific
suggestions, further evaluated the place of the Federal Circuit in the
appellate system and explored tax and social security appeals as illustrative
of certain categories of cases that have frequently been suggested as
candidates for the court's jurisdiction.6'
The sixth section included a recapitulation and concluding observations.
The commissioners asserted that their suggestions were "constructive,
forward-looking innovations [that] do not work radical change... [but
rather] build on the existing circuit structure and alignment [and] ... are
evolutionary, not revolutionary."' 65 They contended that the recom-
mendation for divisional organization of the Ninth Circuit, if successful,
would preserve this court and the entire structure of the appellate system
for the foreseeable future. 6 6 The commission, thus, urged that Congress
authorize two-judge panels, DCAPs, and divisions, which would permit
the Ninth Circuit to continue operating as a "laboratory for innovation."'67
The commission also urged Congress to consider ideas regarding
bankruptcy appeals, discretionary appellate jurisdiction, and other possible
uses of the Federal Circuit. 6 '
The report included additional views. Judge Merritt, whom retired
Justice White joined, offered a different perspective on the issue of
federal jurisdiction. 69 They asserted that docket growth is the foremost
difficulty that the appeals courts face and that caseload increases and
jurisdiction directly implicate circuit structure. 170 Judge Merritt, therefore,
claimed that the majority's narrow interpretation of the commission
mandate to preclude jurisdiction would deprive Congress and the
President of suggestions that could treat the symptoms of, and even cure,
the docket problem.' 7' Accordingly, the dissent urged Congress to reform
163. Id. at 70-72.
164. Id. at 72-74.
165. Id. at 75.
166. Id. at 76.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 75-76.




diversity jurisdiction by prescribing a system that would permit the
removal to federal court only those cases that involve local prejudice or
complex multistate subject matter. 172
In short, the commission compiled a thorough report that determined
that numerous circuits now experience, or could encounter, docket
expansion that might limit prompt, effective, or fair appellate disposition.
The commissioners also comprehensively surveyed potential responses
to mounting appeals. Nonetheless, the commission proffered few
proposals to alter circuit structure, apparently because it found the
complications insufficiently troubling to warrant structural remedies or
because it viewed structural changes as less effective than other
solutions.
B. Critical Analysis
This subsection critically assesses the commission's most notable
recommendations for improvement. Because the statutory charge and the
commissioners emphasized that the Ninth Circuit and adjudicative
divisions were central to the commission's suggestions, I concentrate on
these issues. This subsection then analyzes the commissioners' proposal
that Congress authorize appeals courts to resolve some categories of
cases with two appellate judges or with panels comprised of one circuit
and two district judges. I next briefly evaluate the commission's
treatment of certain structural consequences entailed in authorizing direct
appellate review of bankruptcy decisions and tax and social security
cases as those ideas have been examined elsewhere and the commissioners
only posited recommendations regarding bankruptcy appeals.
1. The Ninth Circuit and Adjudicative Divisions
The commission's core proposal was the call for Congress to establish
three adjudicative divisions of the existing Ninth Circuit, which would
remain intact for administrative purposes.'73 The divisions would be
premised on geography, while a majority of the appellate court judges
stationed in specific locales would have responsibility for reviewing
172. Id.
173. Id. at 41-45; see also supra text accompanying notes 144-46.
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appeals that arise from districts within their jurisdiction and a Circuit
Division would resolve conflicts. 74
The divisional concept would afford some general benefit. The system
would permit the circuit, which has been very successful and whose
administration the commission described as "innovative" in many
ways, 7 ' to continue operating with minimal disruption. For example,
divisions would respect the character of the West as a distinct region by
having one court construe and apply federal law there.'76 The divisional
arrangement would fragment federal practice in the western states less
than circuit-splitting because this scheme would preserve a single circuit
judicial conference and one set of local appellate rules. i" Moreover,
divisions would enable the Ninth Circuit which has demonstrated that
bigger appeals courts can efficiently resolve substantial dockets and
realize certain economies, to continue serving as a model for larger
circuits.' Illustrative are the court's creative testing and refinement of
measures that foster prompt, efficacious, and fair disposition.'79 These
include procedures for tracking issues and cases, alternative dispute
resolution programs, and bankruptcy appellate panels, which Congress
apparently found so successful that it required the remaining appeals
courts to consider instituting them.' The circuit has also been able to
coordinate effectively its active judges by, for example, assigning them
to districts that experience overwhelming caseloads, judicial shortages,
or other difficulties."'
Divisions could offer specific advantages as well.' First, they would
reduce travel expenses for circuit members, attorneys, and litigants.'
Second, the divisional structure might promote collegiality, an elusive
concept that Tenth Circuit Judge Deanell Tacha has defined as "lively,
tolerant, thoughtful debate; it is the open and frank exchange of opinions;
174. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 41-45; see also supra text accompanying notes 144-46.
175. Commission Report, supra note 1, at ix; see also supra text accompanying note 141.
176. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 45; see also supra text accompanying note 142.
177. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 46.
178. Id at 32-37; S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 40; supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
179. Id at 32-37; S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 40; supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
180. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 104, 108 Stat. 4106, 4109-10 ; see
also Long Range Plan, supra note 29, at 47.
181. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 32-37; S. 956 Position Paper, supra note 40; supra
notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
182. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 29-30,47-50.
183. Id
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it is comfortable controversy; it is mutual respect earned through
vigorous exchange."' 84 Appellate judges in the three divisions would sit
together on panels more frequently and, thus, secure increased familiarity
with their colleagues' views on substantive and procedural questions,
interpretive techniques, political issues, and decisional styles.' This
could reinforce the importance of listening and keeping an open mind
while enhancing the judges' ability to hold themselves and each other
accountable and be accountable as a court. 86 These judges and the fewer
district judges whose determinations they would review would know one
another better professionally and personally.'87 Appellate court judges
who are appointed from, and have responsibility for, a smaller
geographic expanse would correspondingly possess or acquire greater
appreciation for the local legal and broader cultures from which appeals
emanate.'88 The Circuit Division should also help preserve consistent
precedent. The commission cogently summarized these ideas when it
claimed that the divisional plan would enhance consistent and coherent
circuit law, maximize the possibility of genuine collegiality, create an
efficacious procedure for maintaining consistent decisional law in the
circuit, and relate the appellate forum more directly to the area it
serves. 8 9 Finally, if divisions prove efficacious in the Ninth Circuit, the
concept should be readily transferable to other courts as they grow,
thereby vitiating the need to consider circuit-splitting elsewhere.' 90
The divisional proposal might impose some disadvantages, or be
relatively ineffective, however. Divisions may not necessarily promote
collegiality and could even lead to disagreement, detrimental routinization,
or bureaucratic rigidity.' 9' It remains unclear whether greater familiarity
with the district judges whose dispositions are being appealed or the
locales from which cases arise will lead to faster, more effective, or fairer
appellate decisionmaking. Instead, the divisional arrangement might
184. Deanell Reece Tacha, The "C" Word: On Collegiality, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 585, 587 (1995); see
also Long Range Plan, supra note 29, at 44-45; William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds,
Elitism, Expediency and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 Cornell L.
Rev. 273, 323-25 (1996).
185. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 29-30, 47-50.
186. Id. at 29-30; Tacha, supra note 185, at 587-9 1.
187. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 47-48.
188. Id.
189. Id. at x.
190. Id. at 29-30, 47-50.
191. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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erode the circuits' discharge of their important federalizing function-
that is, the responsibility for reconciling the U.S. Constitution and
national policies with state and local concerns.'92 Moreover, divisions
will not limit the quantity of Ninth Circuit law that the court's judges
must master, assuming for the purposes of argument that greater mastery
of precedent would foster consistency and coherenc' 93 For example,
appellate judges would have to track the identical quantity of precedent
that they now monitor to mimimize intracircuit inconsistency and
identify potential conflicts requiring Circuit Division resolution. Thus,
the probable effects of the divisional plan are unclear.
How the Circuit Division would operate in practice is also uncertain,
partly because federal courts have never actually applied the measure.
For instance, the notion of inconsistency that triggers the mechanism's
application is imprecise and may even resist definition, 94 while the
Circuit Division's power to articulate circuit law is also not clearly
delineated. Moreover, the device could significantly delay the disposition
of cases in which it is invoked and might increase friction among judges
in the circuit. These phenomena and others, such as the Circuit
Division's composition, mean that the technique may be vulnerable to
criticism for the same reasons that opponents use to attack the limited en
banc procedure. 95 Furthermore, the assignment of California's districts
to different divisions could have detrimental effects, such as fostering
192. See, e.g., Charles A. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts 10-13 (5th ed. 1994); John Minor
Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 Loy. L. Rev. 787, 788 (1980). But see Commission Report,
supra note 1, at 44-45.
193. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 29,34-35. Mastery, in the sense of reading all opinions
issued, may not enhance consistency and coherence as much as modem computerized research. No
empirical data correlate pre-publication circulation of opinions to the courts' judges with increased
consistency or coherence. Moreover, no empirical data correlate circuit size with increased
consistency or coherence.
194. See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 52, at 541; see also McKenna, supra note 27, at 93-98;
Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved Intercircuit
Conflicts, 56 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 693 (1995).
195. The limited en banc procedure consists of the chiefjudge and 10 other circuit judges chosen
essentially by lot who rehear appeals to secure or maintain uniformity and to resolve issues of
exceptional importance. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a); see also 9th Cir. R. 35; Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat.
1633 (1978); Commission Report, supra note 1, at 32. Circuit-splitting proponents argue that "a
panel only slightly larger than a third of the court's full judgeship complement contravenes the very
concept of an 'en banc' court." See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 35. But see id. at 45-49
(justifying Circuit Division measure).
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inconsistent interpretations of California substantive law and forum
shopping, which the Circuit Division may not fully ameliorate. 96
It is important to remember that the Ninth Circuit experimented with
and rejected an approach analogous to divisions twenty years ago.
Former Chief Judge James Browning testified before the commission
that the court's judges unanimously decided to discontinue testing five
months after its institution because they "thought there were discrepancies
developing among the decisions" in the three geographic areas and "there
was a real loss of collegiality. ' 97 Application of the divisional system
could correspondingly limit large circuits' beneficial aspects, such as
diversity, in terms of caseload novelty and complexity as well as
viewpoints, geography, race, and gender, that twenty-eight active judges
can offer. 98
The commissioners perceptively recognized that Congress might
reject adjudicative divisions and decide to restructure the Ninth
Circuit."9 Searching for feasible approaches to reconfiguration and
characterizing the task as daunting, the commission analyzed more than a
dozen models and found them all meritless. The commissioners,
however, examined the three plans that they considered worthy of
argument, but ultimately concluded that each was flawed and prescribed
none. Commission treatment of this issue, through the good faith
exploration of viable options, and its determinations are justifiable.
Others have conducted similar assessments and reached analogous
conclusions that the court defies practicable realignment.2"
2. Structural Options for All the Courts ofAppeals
The structural alternatives that the commission proffered for all of the
appeals courts require comparatively limited examination here.20 ' First,
196. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 1; see also supra notes 20, 33-34 and accompanying
text.
197. Testimony Before the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals of James Browning, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (May 29,
1998) (on file with author). But see Commission Report, supra note 1, at 50 (suggesting how new
"proposal differs fundamentally" from experiment described).
198. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text. Similar considerations would apply to the
use of adjudicative divisions in appeals courts other than the Ninth Circuit.
199. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 54-57.
200. Id.; see also, e.g., Baker, supra note 3, at 945-49; Tobias, supra note 78, at 242-45; see also
Hruska Commission, supra note 14, at 234-42 (analyzing various approaches).
201. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 60-62.
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the concept of divisions as applied to the Ninth Circuit received rather
extensive evaluation above, and the same analysis should apply to the
other circuits. Second, quite a few institutions and federal courts
observers have scrutinized the benefits and disadvantages of two-judge
and district court appellate panels.02 Nonetheless, some exploration of
these ideas is warranted here because it will inform understanding of the
concepts.
The commission's development of adjudicative divisions and its
proposal that Congress empower regional circuits to employ two-judge
panels and DCAPs in certain cases astutely recognize variations among
the courts and that lawmakers must afford them much flexibility to
address future situations. More specifically, the commissioners'
suggestion that individual circuits fashion divisional plans tailored to
their circumstances and that the Ninth Circuit recommendation serve as a
single model properly acknowledge and provide for the realities that
these courts may have diverse needs and might want to respond
differently.20 3
The prescription of two-judge and district court appellate panels also
acknowledges that circuits require flexibility, particularly in conserving
scarce judicial resources. Both forms of panels would save the time that
appellate judges devote to those appeals designated for special treatment,
and DCAPs would capitalize on the greater capacity that now exists at
the district court level.2"4 However, many current trial court judges who
would serve on district court appellate panels were appointed principally
for their trial court expertise and might not "review rigorously, and find
erroneous, rulings" of peers who may be close professional or personal
colleagues.0 5 Moreover, reliance on DCAPs could necessitate the prompt
confirmation of numerous new district judges.0 6 Each kind of panel
might also affect the justice dispensed by, for example, permitting
202. See, e.g., Long Range Plan, supra note 29, at 131-32; McKenna, supra note 27, at 133-39;
Martha Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 Wis.
L. Rev. 11, 58-62; Louis Pollak, Amici Curiae, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 811, 825-26 (1989).
203. Commission Report, supra note 1, at x-xi.
204. See Dragich, supra note 203, at 59; Tobias, supra note 12, at 1278-79; see also Jon 0.
Newman, 1000 Judges-The Limitfor an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76 Judicature 187 (1993).
205. Tobias, supra note 13, at 403-04. I realize that most district judges have or secure appellate
court expertise and many could now ably discharge the error-correction function envisioned.
206. See McKenna, supra note 27, at 138; Baker, supra note 3, at 952. Securing confirmation of
district court nominees is easier. See Neil A. Lewis, Bush Picking the Kind of Judges Reagan
Favored, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1990, at Al; see also Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the
Second Clinton Administration, 23 Hastings Const. L.Q. 741,752 (1997).
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increased error in the categories of cases delineated. However, the
commission proposals provide for instances in which the decisionmakers
on two-judge panels disagree and for discretionary appeals court review
of DCAP determinations.0 7
Subject to the above caveats, the commissioners may have predicted
accurately that these approaches together will permit the circuits to
address continued docket growth and to maintain the appellate process's
quality and decisional consistency, assuming the courts have the requisite
resources. 2 8 If the Ninth Circuit were to experiment with adjudicative
divisions relatively soon, the concept's efficacy could be evaluated and
indicated refinements instituted in time for the other courts to profit from
this testing. The commission's assumption that Congress will appropriate
sufficient funds for the circuits to operate effectively is a critical, yet
troubling, one29 because it may not reflect the political reality of future
legislative budgeting processes. 0
3. Structural Consequences Involving Appellate Jurisdiction 
2 1
The commissioners' recommendation that Congress await the results
of the Judicial Conference study before considering direct appellate court
review of bankruptcy determinations is reasonable.1 The commission
demonstrated that permitting direct review might additionally burden the
regional circuits without improving the quality of decisionmaking. The
commissioners' intimation that discretionary appellate jurisdiction would
not be appropriate today appears convincing. Few persuasive reasons
support this reform, which would alter the time-honored notion that
207. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 62-66; see also supra note 203.
208. Commission Report, supra note 1, at xi.
209. See id.
210. See William H. Rehnquist, 1997 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary (1997); see also
Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 Minn. L. Rev. 375, 379-82,
399-400 (1992); William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts,
1993 Wis. L. Rev. 1; Tobias, supra note 207, at 753.
211. I explore only tersely here the structural ramifications that implicate appellate jurisdiction.
The issues raised by direct appeal of bankruptcy decisions, by making general appellate jurisdiction
discretionary, and by enlarging the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction have been ventilated elsewhere
rather thoroughly, while the commission proffered no affirmative suggestions respecting the latter
two propositions. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 67-68 (noting that National Bankruptcy
Review Commission studied bankruptcy system for several years); Baker, supra note 21, at 234-38
(discussing discretionary jurisdiction); supra note 7 (analyzing Federal Circuit).
212. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 57-61.
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213parties deserve at least one appeal in the federal system. The
commission's assessment of expanding the Federal Circuit's duties to
include appellate resolution of tax and social security cases without
tendering particular suggestions seems defensible.21 '4 These two prospects
have, already received analysis, and Congress would probably be
responsive to the concerns of specialized practitioners and litigants in the
fields involved.
C. Summary by Way of Critique
The commission carefully studied the federal appellate courts and
compiled a report and recommendations that complied with its statutory
mandate; however, it did not complete the extensive evaluation of the
system that is warranted at this important juncture. For example, the
commission gathered very little empirical data on the Ninth Circuit and
the other appeals courts. The commissioners employed only a skeletal
staff and enlisted the assistance of few personnel in the Federal Judicial
Center and the Administrative Office. They also did not spend very much
of the generous $900,000 budget appropriated for the commission's
work, or capitalize on readily available resources, such as law professors,
who might have collected and analyzed instructive empirical information. 215
The commissioners proposed that Congress prescribe adjudicative
divisions without clearly ascertaining that fundamental reform was
actually necessary or that the solution recommended would in fact work
by systematically assembling, assessing, and synthesizing the maximum
quantity of relevant empirical material to support this proposal. The
commission failed to establish conclusively that the Ninth Circuit was
slowly or ineffectively deciding appeals, producing insufficiently
consistent or coherent circuit law, or inefficaciously performing its en
banc function. The commissioners also did not demonstrate definltively
that the implications of the size of the court's geographic jurisdiction for
213. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994); Baker, supra note 21, at 234-38; see also Commission Report,
supra note 1, at 57-61; Robert M. Parker, Jr. & Ron Chapman, Jr., Accepting Reality: The Time for
Adopting Discretionary Review in the Courts ofAppeals Has Arrived, 50 SMU L. Rev. 573 (1997).
214. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 72-74.
215. See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305(b), 111 Stat. 2491, 2492 (1997); see also Commission
Report, supra note 1, at 72-74; Paul Elias, Final 9th Circuit Study Calls for Three Divisions,
Recorder, Dec. 31, 1998, at 3 (reporting that commission spent $500,000). I only mean to suggest
that the commission might have productively used more of the budget than it did, not that the
commission failed to spend profitably the money that it did use orshould have been profligate.
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regionalism, federalism, and effective court operations or its magnitude
for collegiality are troubling, much less problematic enough to require
major change. Instead, the commission relied substantially on the ideas
that smaller decisionmaking units would foster uniformity, predictability,
and collegiality, that more efficacious en banc procedures and the Circuit
Division would guarantee greater consistency and coherence in circuit
law and that the recommended divisional structure would rationalize
appellate courts' regionalizing and federalizing responsibilities to
support the divisions suggested. That proposal would divide the court of
appeals, if not the circuit. In the end, it remains unclear that this
divisional organization would afford the expected benefits because the
federal courts have never implemented the system.'1
6
In fairness, the commission probably achieved as much as could
reasonably be expected during the exceedingly short time frame
Congress provided. For example, the commissioners did accumulate and
analyze some empirical information and showed that expanding
caseloads are now and may be sufficiently troubling to deserve
remediation. The commission correspondingly submitted recommen-
dations, namely for divisions and two-judge and district court appellate
panels, that would ameliorate difficulties, such as delayed resolution,
attributable to docket growth. The commissioners also recognized that a
few suggestions, primarily the divisional arrangement, could have
detrimental side effects and, thus, called for the concepts' testing and
evaluation over a specific period. The commission provided for
considerable flexibility by proposing sequential experimentation with
divisions and urging that Congress authorize, rather than require, circuits
to effectuate most measures, including special panels. Insofar as the
commissioners' efforts are vulnerable to criticism, a more appropriate
target would be Congress which, for instance, only accorded the
commission a year to complete an enormous task with a relatively
ambiguous charge.
216. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 72-74. Similar ideas apply to the proposals
regarding two-judge panels and DCAPs. For instance, the commission did not clearly show that the
circuits face difficulties that require remediation. However, docket growth adversely affects




IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Congress and the federal appellate courts should carefully consider the
report and recommendations issued by the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals and effectuate those
suggestions that will enable the appellate system and individual circuits
to resolve cases expeditiously, efficaciously, and equitably. Lawmakers
and courts might defer somewhat to the expert, independent entity that
Congress authorized because the commissioners spent a year scrutinizing
the appeals courts and developing a report and proposals for their
improvement. Legislators and judges should consult the broadest
spectrum of potential remedies for the difficulties that the courts
currently face and will confront, while simultaneously tailoring solutions
to the specific problems of each circuit. Members of Congress and the
judiciary should proceed cautiously, as the courts' futures are at stake.
For example, to the extent that lawmakers or judges entertain doubts
regarding the complications that circuits do or will experience, the
precise impacts of commission recommendations or the effectiveness of
particular approaches, they should defer action, consider additional
study, or institute experimentation before implementing irrevocable
remedies such as a circuit split."'
A. Congrers
Because the evidence on which the commissioners relied did not
conclusively demonstrate that caseload growth is sufficiently troubling to
deserve remediation, or that the divisional or panel arrangements would
be improvements, Congress should seriously consider several possible
courses of action. The House and the Senate, through their respective
judiciary committees, may want to scrutinize the commission's report
and suggestions or solicit greater public input, especially from appeals
217. I principally address Congress because it must implement most of the commissioners'
suggestions and the courts can effectuate only a few. However, the Judicial Conference of the United
States, the policymaking arm of the federal courts, and the Judicial Councils, the governing entities
in the circuits, as well as individual appellate and district judges should review and comment on the
commission's proposals. These institutions and jurists are peculiarly well-equipped to predict how
the measures will work in practice, while the courts' cooperation will be crucial to successful
application of any reforms that Congress adopts. The Conference, however, has limited authority to
bind the circuits with respect to most of the commission recommendations, but the Conference over
which the Chief Justice presides and whose members include each circuit's Chief Judge could speak
persuasively to many proposals. The Councils might implement a few suggestions. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 331-32 (1994).
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court judges and users, on this work. The committees could also
independently examine the matters that the commissioners analyzed.
Moreover, members of Congress might employ the recently introduced
bills that embody the commission's recommendations, and the measures
could serve as vehicles for evaluating the relevant issues, reassessing the
commissioners' findings, and refining their suggestions.1 8 Absent further
study, efforts to ascertain whether the commission properly determined
that docket growth in the Ninth Circuit and other courts is problematic
enough to merit treatment will prove inconclusive. Without additional
study, attempts to determine whether the solutions that the commission
proffered would be efficacious will similarly be inconclusive.1 9
These propositions mean that Congress may want to authorize
experimentation with techniques that could address increasing caseloads
and the difficulties that led to the commission's recommendations. This
testing should continue for sufficient time in enough contexts to ascertain
the efficacy of those concepts. The preferable approach might be to
approve Ninth Circuit testing of a divisional structure modeled on the
commission proposal, as appropriately refined, and to encourage
experimentation in some appeals courts with other mechanisms, such as
two-judge and district court appellate panels. Testing of additional
measures, including bankruptcy appellate panels and expanded Federal
Circuit jurisdiction, should also be considered. More specifically, the
divisional concept could be implemented for seven years, as the
commissioners recommended, in the Ninth Circuit. Two-judge panels or
DCAPs might correspondingly be instituted for a similar period in
circuits, namely the Fifth and Eleventh, that are encountering significant
docket growth. Congress could empower the Federal Circuit for an
analogous time to experiment with tax or social security appeals, while
some appellate courts that have not employed BAPs may want to
implement them voluntarily.2 ' An expert, independent entity, such as the
218. Congress, which commissioned the year-long study, will be reluctant to appear as if it is
second-guessing the commission or may prefer deferring to the expert, independent entity, although
senators who disagree with commission findings or suggestions are unlikely to accede.
219. Illustrative of the type of studies needed is Professor Hellman's meticulous analysis of
consistency and related issues for more than a decade. See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 52; Hellman,
By Precedent, supra note 195.
220. BAPs may be the only measures that courts can adopt without congressional authority. See
supra note 181 and accompanying text. Ninth Circuit divisions could arguably be vouched through
the 1978 statute prescribing measures for large circuits. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
However, the controversial nature of the authority question and the significant character of the




RAND Corporation, must rigorously analyze this testing by systematically
collecting, assessing, and synthesizing the maximum amount of dependable
empirical information.2 ' Once that experimentation has occurred and
received careful, evaluation, it should be possible to delineate more
precisely those problems that the appeals courts are experiencing that
deserve long-term treatment and to identify the most efficacious solutions
for the complications designated. Congress then can pass legislation, if
warranted, to implement any permanent changes that are indicated.
Lawmakers may wish to examine the institution of additional actions.
Because most circuits have faced rising caseloads but have possessed
inadequate resources to address them, and many of the courts will
probably confront similar circumstances in the future, Congress could
invoke several responses. First, it might analyze ways to reduce the
number of appeals by, for instance, limiting federal civil or criminal
jurisdiction, an approach that retired Justice White and Judge Merritt
proposed. 22 However, legislators probably will not restrict federal
jurisdiction;2" therefore, they must evaluate means of responding directly
to docket expansion. For example, Congress could augment resources in
the form of more judgeships or increased staff. 4 It might also explore a
broad spectrum of structural and non-structural measures for treating
caseload growth.'
Finally, if lawmakers remain uncertain about the commission's
findings or suggestions, they may want to authorize additional study of
the system or specific courts. The commission admirably discharged its
substantial responsibilities in a brief period; however, the lack of time
and other restraints might have prevented the entity from completing the
type of thorough analysis that may be needed. Congress, accordingly,
221. Illustrative are studies of federal civil justice reform. See, e.g., James S. Kakalik et al., An
Evaluation of Judicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act (1996); James S.
Kakalik et al., Implementation of the Civil Justice Reform Act in Pilot and Comparison Districts
(1996); see also Commission Report, supra note 1, at 40 (proposing FJC study).
222. See supra notes 170-73 and accompanying text; see also LongRange Plan, supra note 29, at
134; McKenna, supra note 27, at 141-53.
223. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Administering Justice in the First Circuit, 24 Suffolk U. L. Rev.
29, 34-37 (1990); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief The Federalization of American
Criminal Law, 46 Hastings L.. 1135 (1995); Dragich, supra note 203, at 16-17.
224. See Baker, supra note 21, at 202; see also Carl Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time
of Divided Government, 47 Emory L.J. 527 (1988); Tobias, supra note 78, at 235.
225. For comprehensive treatment of these measures, see Baker, supra note 21, and McKenna,
supra note 27.
Washington Law Review
might consider extending the commission's life or authorizing another
assessment, which would build on its work in the near term.
B. The Courts
The Judicial Conference should carefully review and respond to the
commission's report and recommendations. The Conference might
accord some deference to the commissioners and should solicit the views
of particular appellate and district judges who will be familiar with the
courts' circumstances and how to treat them. More specifically, the
Conference ought to decide whether implementation of, or experimentation
with, divisions and two-judge or district court appellate panels is advisable
systemwide or in individual circuits. If the entity concludes that
effectuation or testing of divisional or panel arrangements is indicated, it
should identify courts based on diversity of case complexity, docket size,
and judicial resources to apply the measures most productively.
The Conference might also formulate positions on the three issues
related to appellate jurisdiction that implicate structure. For example, the
entity could ascertain whether the commission's opposition to direct
bankruptcy appeals is appropriate.226 The Conference may wish to
consult the work of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission
because this group called for congressional approval of direct appeals.227
However, it appears preferable for the Conference to await the results of
the study that it recently commissioned. The Judicial Conference could
also consider the propriety of making appellate review discretionary.228
However, that prospect has received thorough discussion within and
outside Congress for several decades, and modifying appeal of right
would contravene a venerated tradition in American jurisprudence. The
Conference, as well, might develop positions on the advisability of
enlarging the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction to encompass tax or social
security cases or experimenting with appeals in either of those areas.229
The Judicial Conference must seriously evaluate the recommendation
of Judge Merritt and retired Justice White on diversity jurisdiction
226. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at xi, 57-74; see also supra text accompanying notes
160-65.
227. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 72-74.
228. See id. at 70-72.
229. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. The Conference ought to seek the views of the
court's judges and attorneys and parties who pursue these cases.
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because jurisdiction was arguably within the statutory mandate, and
application of the commissioners' idea could alleviate the pressures that
appellate courts are experiencing." The Conference might formulate a
position on this issue, although Congress has rejected similar proposals
that would limit diversity jurisdiction since 1945."1
The Judicial Councils in the circuits ought to consider many of the
commission's suggestions that involve particular appeals courts. For
example, the Ninth Circuit should closely examine the commissioners'
divisional proposal and may want to fashion a position on whether
immediate implementation or experimentation is preferable, although the
commission's recent recommendation would essentially facilitate testing.
In response to issues that the Commission raised, Chief Judge Hug
appointed an Evaluation Committee to analyze the Ninth Circuit and
report suggestions for improvement. 2 The council-might specifically
suggest that divisions receive experimentation and rigorous assessment
for some period after which Congress could decide on the concept's
broader application. Restricted testing and expert analysis should
indicate whether the divisional approach warrants permanent adoption in
this court and extension to other circuits. The remaining councils may
wish to determine whether divisions or two-judge or district court
appellate panels deserve effectuation or experimentation in their circuits.
The councils could also develop positions on the propriety of direct
bankruptcy appeals and of making appellate jurisdiction discretionary,
while the judges of the Federal Circuit could evaluate the wisdom of
enlarging the court's jurisdiction.
The comnilssion carefully assessed the circuits and made constructive
suggestions in the brief time available. However, the Judicial Conference
and individual courts should undertake more examination. For example,
greater scrutiny might reveal felicitous means of expediting appeals that
have applicability systemwide or to specific circuits. In the foreseeable
future, it also appears that docket growth will continue but that the courts
will have few additional resources for treating cases. The Conference and
230. Commission Report, supra note 1, at 78-79; see also supra text accompanying notes 170-73.
231. See Commission Report, supra note 1, at 78-79.
232 Media Release, Chief Judge Hug Appoints Evaluation Committee and Releases Analysis of





the circuits, therefore, should continue evaluating the courts' situations
and experimenting with promising measures.
V. CONCLUSION
The Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals recently completed a study of the appellate system and issued a
report and recommendations that could influence the courts' destiny in
the twenty-first century. The commissioners admirably discharged their
serious responsibility in the short period that Congress provided.
Members of Congress and the federal judiciary must closely analyze the
commission's work and implement those ideas which will improve the
system. To achieve effective reforms in the appellate courts, the
Congress and the judiciary should experiment with the commission's
proposed reforms before they institute permanent structural changes. The
diverse characteristics of each circuit require flexible approaches that are
tailored to the specific court's circumstances. Moreover, the lack of
compelling empirical evidence warranting change may well suggest the
need for additional study.
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